VIETNAM

Mr. DIREKSEN, Mr. President, on yesterday we had very considerable discussion of the situation in Vietnam, and I think it raged into the question of the conduct of that struggle.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I suggest that the Chamber be cleared and that there be order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chamber will be cleared, and we will have order. All attached whose presence is not needed in the Chamber will remove themselves from the Chamber.

The Sergeant at Arms is directed to see that these instructions to clear the Chamber are carried out.

The Senator from Illinois may proceed.

Mr. DIREKSEN. Mr. President, from time to time inquiry has been made of me about what seems like dissident views that have been expressed on this question of Vietnam, and particularly as it relates to the minority side of the aisle.

I have stated over and over again that the President's position and the Republican Party's position is ample for all purposes and for all shades of opinion. I have only two concerns. The first is, of course, that we do not try to violate the constitutional prerogative of the President of the United States.

The first article of the Constitution does give to the Congress the power of the purse. And, in exercise of that power, we can discipline virtually everything in Government.

The Congress is also the exclusive lawmaking body in our form of government, and we can abolish every bureau. We can abolish nearly every agency. We cannot abolish the Presidency or the Supreme Court because they are constitutional offices. However, with those exceptions, we can go pretty far in exercising our exclusive function as the one and only lawmaking body. The fact that a whole body of administrative law has developed in this country was only possible under a delegation of power by Congress.

So, we have the power of the purse, and when the Constitution made the President the Commander in Chief, it tendered him the sword of the country. And that includes not only the conduct of our foreign relations, but also the conduct of any struggle or hostility in which we might be engaged.

The only other concern I have is about my own conduct in this matter. I want to be sure it is in conformity with my conscience and my conviction. Beyond that, it does not make any difference.

because my responsibility is to explore for the facts, to ascertain as much as I can on a given subject, and then to exercise an independent judgment.

Mr. President, I hope I have not failed to do that, for Edmond Burke once remarked in Parliament that he felt he would betray his constituency if he did not do that. I grant the same privilege, the same prerogative, and the same latitude of every Member of the Senate.

What is more, I have no hostility toward criticism. I think it was in World War I that Woodrow Wilson said that in time of war we need more criticism, not less. But always it has to be within the framework of our constitutional power, and we must not arrogate to ourselves the conduct of an external struggle.

I think we have had some lessons in that field. Mr. President, the very capital, where we sit in the Senate wing, was destroyed in the War of 1812 because there was too much civil interference with the conduct of that war.

Lincoln did not break any interference from a committee that was set up on the conduct of the war. I think it was General Grant who said that the greatest aid for him was from none other than Jefferson Davis, the President of the Confederacy, because he was interfering with Robert E. Lee and his tactics and his strategy.

Who shall say what the outcome of that war would have been if there had been a Union military board of the South had been left alone? Nobody knows, but that interference was helpful, and Grant recognized it and paid testimony to it.

So, I grant that right, but I hope always it will be within due bounds. However, criticism, I always recognize.

On Sunday I had an experience and at first, I did not know how it came about. The operator of a very splendid motel in Galesburg, III., called me on the telephone. I scarcely know him. He said that he and the city—having a population of about 40,000—were going to be hosts to about 130 or 140 Vietnam veterans, all wounded, who were in the hospital at Great Lakes, Ill.

The whole community was energized to turn out for these youngsters. They lodged them. They fed them. They brought them from Great Lakes to Galesburg, a distance of 150 miles, and they took them back.

I was asked to get on the telephone at 5 o'clock on Sunday and to make them a telephone speech, which I did.

When the speech was over, a sergeant by the name of Wright was designated to respond to the speech, and he did.

He said:

Senator, we want to thank you. You are in our corner, and you have stood up for us, and you stood up for the cause. And we, the wounded from Vietnam, want you to know it from us. And we say it as sincerely, as simply, as emphatically as we can say it.

What I did first on Sunday was to salute them as a measure of deference, because a salute is given to a superior, and I recognize the superiority of their sacrifice. They come back without legs and without arms. And if anybody wants to see what Vietnam has done, he needs only to go out to Walter Reed, which is an evacuation hospital, to see the results.

When flowers came into my room at the hospital from time to time, I got a cart and went down to the Vietnam wards with those bouquets. They were better for them than for me. However, I have yielded nobody in my hope, in my desire, and in my prayers that somehow this insane and grim and grisly business can honorably come to an end.

I think you have to say that for the President of the United States. I cannot be in position, and I cannot under any circumstances, denigrate him or demean him in the eyes of the world in connection with this controversy by anything that I might say. And so, granting all this latitude to anybody in the legislative branch of the Government, I feel that the time has come to say a little more than I have said on the subject of Vietnam.

I recognize my kinship with those who were out in Galesburg, Ill., by virtue of a common uniform which I wore 50 years ago as a private first class, as a sergeant, and as a second lieutenant in France on the western front. That is a kinship that you cannot forget.

And I want to be sure that almost a half million American boys who are out there in the cause of our country will not be the forgotten men under any circumstances, because they are too precious as Americans who have responded and are willing to do their duty even if the last and supreme sacrifice is required for their services.

I will never forget as I think of the thousands who have died. In addition to the thousands who have been wounded, the lines of Colonel McCrae that Canadian doctor who had a field dressing station on the banks of the Ypres River in France, and saw the bodies roll down into the door of his
We are the Dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow.
Loved and were loved, and now we lie
In Flanders fields.

Well, some boys are lying out there.
I do not know what I would say to the faces of those who made that sacrifice.
I want to be there if I can, that it is not a vanity and that I fully recognize my responsibility in an anxious hour like this.

It was said the other day:
That our programs and our policies are for all alike.
Where, I would like to know? Who besides Charles de Gaulle has been so bold as to affront us in this field? Thirty countries are helping us now.
Have you heard it from Australia? Have you heard it from Canada? Have you heard it from New Zealand?
Have you heard it from Korea? Indeed, not.
The nations have been there in our corner.
They did not always send troops,
but there were other kinds of assistance that they sent.

So is it a good sentiment to utter, that we are suspect by friend and foe alike? I do not know where it is, and I want to see the proof.
Do not try to see it go on the dispatch wires into every corner of the earth, to make a fable.
I remember once doing some work on immigration, trying to help India; and when I got to Bombay and Calcutta, the headlines were that high—"India's Friend Is Here."
Well, is there a provincial here, or parochial, nothing is limited. What we say goes on the wire. And if you want a lesson, send somewhere— I could tell you where—to get the international shortwave monitor, and see what is said on the Senate floor, which goes out of the shortwave stations from Peking and from Nanci and elsewhere.

How good is it for the morale of the troops? You ought to be out there on the front on a lonely night, when the bombs are dropping, and the mortar shells are coming over, and you ask yourself what the difference is, yes, they begin to wonder whether they are the forgotten men,
and are forgotten back home. It is a ghastly feeling, I can tell you; and sometimes I had it on the four front a long, long time ago. That is the thing about which I want to be extremely careful.

It has been said that the President was brainwashed by a military-industrial complex, I would have to have heard that said about General Eisenhower, the grand captain of the second great crusade mission in world affairs. I do not believe anybody ever said it about him, great tactician that he was, great strategist, that he was.
They combed the Army to find him, Mr. Marshall was deeply attached to him. And so he became the grand captain.

Well, I cannot imagine how he feels about a statement like that. It does not sound good and it does not look good, because he was the President, who served us with honor and distinction. And it would not sound good about any President.

Have you heard the British demeal their King and Queen? If you have, show me the day and the time.
Why, we were so circumspect about it that when the King and Queen were our guests, we set up a scaffolding in that rotunda so that the telephone and telephone system could be seen.
And then the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga and the surrender of Lord Cornwallis.
That is how circumspect we were, and I was there, turning around in the place, to find out what it was all about.

There are demands in the papers. The President is not our ruler, you do not demean him in the eyes of people abroad;
for when you do, you demean the prestige of this Republic. And I do not mean to do it, as the one remaining, great, free republic on the face of the earth.

Yesterday the question about security came up. Where was our security? I heard the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee ask these questions. I am no tactician, goodness knows, I have been to the command staff school as a lieutenant, but I am no tactician. I am no strategist. But I do know this, Mr. President, from those with whom I have associated in government:
that our outer defense perimeter started in Korea and went to South Vietnam. Now, from South Vietnam, it is at the lower end. That is our left flank.
Suppose the left flank of your line is turned and you lose Vietnam? Then what?

The distinguished Senator from Hawaii can certainly tell us about how close it is from the Philippines to Malaysia and to Indonesia. And you cite to me a holding station where you can hold if we lose Vietnam. There is no place short of Singapore. Anybody who has some perspective, any sense of strategy, can tell you that. And when you are in Singapore, you are at one of the clogged water courses that I am confident, as surely as I am standing here, the Soviets are going to try to control. Control Panama, control Singapore, the two ends of the Gulf of Aden in Iraq, and you have just out command of the world. That is all you need.

So you have to see this in perspective.
There is no holding line between Saigon and Singapore. So when they speak about the future of Vietnam, what future do they mean? Can we not kid that?
And I am not disposed to quarrel with men who have gone through our military schools, who have worked with worldwide maps, and who are expected to plot this thing in the large.
That is what you need for the security of the country.

There may be Members in this body this afternoon who may remember, as I remember, when during the war we went down to the Munitions Building for briefings by General Marshall, the Chief of Staff.
I almost fell out of my seat one morning. These were members of the Appropriations Committee. I almost fell out of my seat when suddenly, out of a cloud, he said:

Gentlemen, I may have bad news for you.

We waited with bated breath. He said:
Our best intelligence tells us that the Japanese are going to invade Alaska, and for the moment we can't stop them. We can't redeploy our troops from the Pacific. We think the strategy we followed is correct; and if they invade Alaska, we'll have to let them do it.

What do you think the wave would have in this country if the Japanese Army had suddenly invaded Alaska? I ask you.

If it would have been a wave of such intensity that I expect people would ground their ships and get into the boats, and then the throats of leaders down here for letting our domain be invaded. But General Marshall was a soldier and a great one. He knew what he had to do, no matter how much he might be scolded and he kept the ship's course. He did not know how we came out. He was right and I do not try to argue with them about it.

That is our outside security line. Suppose it fails. I think the Senator from Missouri could tell us the answer. It will run from Alaska to Hawaii, and you tell me how far you are from San Francisco and Los Angeles, as to whether or not our security is involved out there in Asia. If I did not think it was, I guess I would take another good look at this whole business before we get through with it.

It has been said we have not emphasized the political needs and aspects of this controversy in the face of the fact that maybe we cannot get a military solution. Have we defaulted in that field? I thought they had an election out there to pick a constitutional assembly. I thought they had an election out there. Senator Musgrave and Senator Hickenlooper went there as observers from this side.

They came back and said that in their judgment it was a fair and honest election.
They brought back ballots, tell them who indicated and indicated exactly how the people went to the polls. It is not strange that in this second election in September a half million more people voted than had voted in the earlier election? Does that mean anything? It means we have done something to dispel fears in Vietnam and in showing back the Vietcong so that life can pursue its normal course. Has that been neglecting the political fabric? Those figures simply do not prove it.

I reemphasize these two facts largely because, I think, we have lost track of what our security really is.

There is a pretty small consideration when one thinks of these high-speed bombers. The designers are not at all satisfied with the speeds we get today, and I presume that would be particularly true with respect to military aircraft. They have just tied this great ball into short reach, and you can go from here to there in very short order. When you do so on a pair of wings, you can have in the fuselage the lethal and the weapons that will impair our security. Let no one say our security is not involved, and with it, of course, the peace of the world is involved.

Who can forget how fast these things move. Here was a staff. I suppose almost everybody has forgotten his name. His name was1. And he was standing in a doorway in the little town of Sarajevo. When the Austrian Archduke and his Duchess, who were the heirs to the throne, came by, out comes the pistol and he shoots and both die before they get to the hospital. The legends are set in motion. The boos on the cobblestones.
I wish I had my notebook with me so that I could read a few of the notes—
they would knock your hair off as to what they had in mind as to the ultimate in
a free society. Their idea was that our
free society would have to be restruc-
tured, that there could be no freedom
anywhere.
But, I say, what will happen when freedom goes?
What is that old ditty—

No man escapes when freedom fails.
Most must go.
And those who cry "appease, appease."
Are hanged by those they sought to please.

Mr. President, that is one reason why
our boys are in Vietnam. Let freedom
slip, and it begins to slip everywhere.
We remember that Churchill said he
was not the King's first minister to
preside over the liquidation of the
British Empire.
Let me say that I was not made
a Senator to preside over the liquidation
of the holy fabric of freedom. May I be
the last ever to approach that kind of task.

Well, Mr. President, Ashmore and
Baggs go out there. I followed that pretty
closely. I thought perhaps they were
really going to "pin one on." But read be-
tween the lines. What and how much did
they get out of Hanoi if we stopped
bombing? It could have evanest into
something. Not that it would. It just
could. They came back emptyhanded.
But they had enough for a few headlines.

I consigned Ashmore and Baggs to the
wastebasket. I received a letter from them
excoriating me for identifying them with
the Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions.
Well, Mr. President, they have not
heard the last of it. I say to my friends
of California. They will hear a lot more
on that subject before I get through,
because if this is going to be the new
politics in our country, predicated on the
theory that freedom must be liquidated,
then the time has come for me to do it.
Thus, I just "kiss off" Ashmore and
Baggs after their escapades on the front
pages. I doubt very much whether they
will make any significant history from
now on.

No, I get back to one more point, and
then I think I have said enough.

In 1953 we actually went abroad to
bring the grand captain back, made him
the head of our party and elected him to
the Presidency of the United States.
We reckoned on him in 1956. If there hadn't
no constitutional prohibition on a third
term, I make so bold as to say that
Dwight D. Eisenhower had sufficient of
the trust, esteem, and confidence of the
American people to be elected for a third
term.

Thus, it would occur to me that we who
have been associated with him in a common
party, we who have gone to see him
so often at the Tuesday morning sessions
at the White House, could very well, when
we are overcome and troubled by problems
of this kind, where we are discovering a
spirit in what appears on the outside to
deprive us of the kind of party disassociation, we
could take a little more counsel from his
because he is a great tactician and a great
strategist. He is now at that age where

The moment we are on the defensive,
we cannot be near a technique of this
kind. Is that what we want to do?
Is that what we want to say to General
Westmoreland and our troops out there?
I do not.
Some other time, but later the truth has
to come to the American people.

A great point was made about taking
all this to the Security Council. That
matter was argued in this Chamber for
hours on yesterday, as if it had not been
up there. They made a real endeavor. We
have to get nine votes. Yes, there is no
veto power where a procedural matter
is involved, and this would be procedural.
But, we could not get them. We
could not energize the members of the Council
to talk a real interest in it.

Suppose, however, we did get nine
votes. What would be the next step? Not
procedural. It would have to be substan-
tive.

How do we get a substantive matter
before the Council, with the Soviet Union
sitting there with a veto? I do not think
we have looked at all down that road. Inquiry leads
me to believe that our Ambassador to
the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg,
has not been urged in trying to get some
kind of action in the Security Council.
He has not been successful.

Thus, Mr. President, in all the discus-
sion on yesterday, I do not think
it came to anything because I doubt
very much whether it was pursued to a
real conclusion.

I fairly shuddered when the two newspap-
er editors, Ashmore and Baggs, finally
got visas from the State Department and
went out to Hanoi.

If I had been at the State Department,
they would not have gotten any visas,
because they are both associated, as I
understand it, with the Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions, in
Santa Barbara. That is where Robert
Woodrow Wilson lived while a student of the Uni-
versity of Chicago, is. Senators should
read some of the stuff that comes out of
that center. I sent for and got lots of it.

I delivered quite a lecture on one. The
subject was "Justice for All, Freedom for
None."
Mr. Fulbright. Mr. President, I have listened to the distinguished minority leader with a great deal of interest. All of us have very deep respect and affection for the Senator from Illinois, and certainly he always counted himself as one of those who admire Mr. Fulbright very much. He has great talents and I particularly enjoy his company. It pains me very much to have a different view on such an important matter of policy.

Mr. Fulbright. Mr. President, I have spoken from the deepest conviction that he has the deepest conviction when he says he is not a Senator to liquidate the holy fabric of freedom. I am sure he feels that way. I feel just as strongly that the pursuit of this war under the conditions that exist today is more likely to undermine the holy fabric of freedom because of what could well be a war of indefinite tenure, indefinite existence, and possibly involve China.

So what we are arguing about is not the objective. I think the objective of the Senator from Illinois and that of myself and those of us who disagree with the position in Vietnam is identical. We do have this difference of judgment, and it is a judgment based upon similar facts, as to the best way to go about preserving our freedom.

The Senator expressed his very deep feelings for the men in Vietnam. All of us share that. There are many of us who have been represented in this body by everyone in this body and we are all getting, almost daily, notices of their death or injury. The difference is, I think, that those of us who would like to liquidate this war believe that we are acting in the interest of those men in Vietnam. We do not wish them to stay there. Also, we believe it is not in the national interest to do so.

So it seems to me the question is narrowed a bit if we get down to some of the issues that are related to this question. What is the objective of our Vietnam policy? Is it in the interest of this country and the preservation of our strength?

The Senator intimated, in one section of his speech, that our security is involved. Yesterday I said I thought our security was involved by maintaining a strong community, not depending on our resources, manpower, and money, in the South Vietnamese. This is not a part of the world which it seems to me has ever has been regarded heretofore as something of vital importance to the United States.

The Senator from Illinois mentioned President Eisenhower, a great general. When President Eisenhower was in office, this matter was presented to him. In 1954, he had carefully selected a Chief of Staff, General Ridgway and General Galvin. They understood the study of the United States support of the French in Vietnam. Very wisely, after a thorough examination, General Ridgway recommended against it. Although there were powerful people in that administration, including the Secretary of State, and Admiral Radcliffe, there were other people. But President Eisenhower, exercising his responsibility as President, decided against it. I think history will prove his right.

General MacArthur had made a statement, not under these same circumstances, but after what I should say, to the effect that it would be very foolish to engage in a land war on the continent of Asia.

I believe there are other leading military men who have taken that view. There has been a difference of opinion from the beginning of the military establishment on this particular problem. But General Eisenhower at least made a decision not to go into that precise area, Vietnam. I believe that at the time there was the question of landing in North Vietnam, but anyway, it was in the area of Vietnam, and he decided not to go to the aid of the French.

We were at that time in a false position in supporting a colonial power, which was contrary to the tradition of this country. I think this whole operation has been afflicted with this weakness. The idea of Vietnam would threaten the security of this country by bombs or other means is not realistic.

I assume that what the Senator is saying is that Russia and/or China will use it as a base to attack us. I do not know what other reason would lead us to say that what happens in South Vietnam is a direct threat to the security of the United States.

If it Russia that is the threat, I do not see why we should feel that Vietnam to be a threat to the United States. At any rate, Russia, not so long ago, had missiles in Cuba and withdrew them. If she is determined on such an attack, I do not know why she withdrew those missiles in Cuba.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That may have been their motive.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Well, it was the case.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But I do say they did not cause nearly the destruction, in the 90 years they were there, that we have caused in 2 years. I am sure they did not kill anything like as many people. I do not think they dealt with the life of the people in Vietnam as much.

I do not mean that we have done this because of bad motives; we have done it through lack of wisdom, I will say.

But if it may come back to it, the question which I think is central, and which we are really interested in, is what policies should we follow in this country. Surely just what kind of government they may have in South Vietnam is not of such importance to us as to justify our risking 500,000 men. We have already suffered 15,000 deaths, and nearly 85,000 casualties. To compare that with the fact that a government in a little country that has never before had a representative government, and say that we must give them precisely what we think they ought to have, does not make any sense to me.

It is the question of our security, I think, not of their government. Surely we could agree that all that we are doing is not worthwhile, simply to give this little country representative government, or a democratic government, if you like, which the people in the same fashion we do in Chicago, or in Harlem, or in Arkansas. Whether it is necessary to the security of this country, seems to me to be the crucial point.

I cannot see that it is crucial to our security, or if it is, the contrary, when we consider the cost that we are now undertaking, and what we have already suffered—the Senator knows how much we are spending; it is now estimated at the rate of $30 billion a year. The casualty list will be much greater than it was last year. We have already suffered, this year, more casualties than in all of last year. The rate is going up, and will continue to go up if the war is intensified, one would suppose.

Is it worth the cost? It seems to me that it would be only if this is a very strategic area, from the point of the security of our country. I cannot see that the proponents of the war have made a case, their argument does not appeal to me, and I am not interested. If anyone can make that point.

On the contrary, as I said yesterday, the Chinese first stated this thought, and I think it has some validity; if we were not there, they could not challenge the United States; they have no air force there. I am speaking of now, not South Vietnam that neither South Vietnam nor North Vietnam have anything that they could attack us with is self-evident. The Chinese have no air security, they have one bomb, they have, I believe, a very primitive nuclear weapon, but no delivery system, as of now.

In addition to that, while we have apparently built up great fear and apprehension about it, there is nothing, really, to build up fear about. It is where else that I have heard of, indicating any fervent desire on the part of the Chinese to attack us in the foreseeable future. That will depend, of course, a great deal upon the way we conduct ourselves, in regard to China.

But what we are doing is sending our men over there and having them slaughtered. We are spending our money, we are disrupting our economy, we are confronted with an enormous inflow of tax dollars, we do not do anything about the tax bill, but the news in the papers every day says it will have very hard sledding. If that does not come through, there will be a deficit of some $28 or $30 billion. That will cause further disruption here.

Then there is the division within our own country, the lack of unity and cooperation among our citizens in carrying out our policy. This is a very serious thing for a great and powerful country of this kind. The alienation of the young people—you can laugh all you like at hippies, but it is not just hippies. I have been to a number of universities in this country, at least there are very few. The most responsible and intelligent young people of this country do not support this war, by and large. They have given every evidence of it in practically every university in this country, I know.

Not that that in itself is decisive, but it is indicative of a lack of justification for this war. It has not been made a self-evident fact of life that it is in our interest to pursue this, there is no question of this sort in the Second World War. There was very little question in Korea. There was certainly none in the First World War. Why is it that there is such a great question now? Can one not explain the feeling of those who oppose this war could have some validity? Might that not be indicated by the fact that it is shared by so many people in this country?

All of us are elected here. I do not think that the people have expressed their opposition to the continuation of this particular war—and I say "this particular war" because it is not like any of the other wars which have been mentioned—either to me, to the President or to the Senate.

To make it out that Ho Chi Minh is like Hitler is nonsense. He has none of the characteristics. His country has none of the power, or characteristics of power, that Germany had. His kind of analogy makes no sense whatever to me. We have to judge it on the facts of this case; and it seems very strange to me that so many people in this country, of all types and characters, are concerned with the particular war and the fashion in which we are pursuing it. I think it is something to give the Senate pause, and believe that we should all participate, as are the President from Illinois, and his colleagues from the side, and those of us on this side of the aisle, in discussing this problem.

I think the Senator has rendered a great service in opening up the subject. He always attracts attention to these important questions, and the other Senator can, because of his own very special talents, which we all appreciate. But I think it seems a very fine thing to discuss it, if we can arrive—and I hope we can—upon whether the national interests, the vital security interests of this country, lie, and what pursuit, what policies, would best promote them. If we could arrive at such an agreement, it would be the greatest favor we could render, not only to the President, but to this country.

The suggestions about using the United Nations, it seems to me, are entirely inappropriate. We helped to create that body. We have been its principal sponsor. I do not think the suggestions that have been made should be dismissed because, in the past, the United Nations has not been able to solve problems. I think it should be given a real try. And I do not think we have yet given it a real try, partly because of the feeling that it is futile. Under the serious conditions that now exist, I do not believe that we should use it purely in a political sense, and I do not think we have, to obtain the agreement of the Security Council to put this matter on the agenda and have it discussed, and hopefully to have some resolution of it, with the assistance of the Security Council.

I can only say that I hope all Senators will do as have the Senator from Illinois, the Senator from California, and others, in talking about this matter and seeking to resolve it.

All the other matters that we have before us seem to be connected with Vietnam—the foreign aid program has been affected by it, and almost all the other matters that have come before my committee are related to the assistance of the Asian Development Bank. All of the consideration comes around to the question of what is going to happen to Vietnam. Unless we can resolve this, it is like a cancer eating into all our other problems, and it is affecting our budget. It affects the tax bill. All of these matters relate to Vietnam.

If the Members of the Senate cannot discuss it and hopefully come to some agreement, I think the country is going to be more and more divided. We are going to get in deeper and deeper trouble.

I do not know what the answer is. We have to make some agreement on it, it seems to me. It is an intolerable situation for the most powerful country in the world with all its vast resources at its disposal to be in this position, apparently not able to make up its mind. Its mind is not made up. Even though the President has said he cannot do it, he cannot indefinitely without the support of the country. I think we can agree to that.

Difficulties will arise in other fields. Difficulties have already arisen in other fields. They are not directly affected, but are indirectly affected by Vietnam.

So, I could overexaggerate the importance of the Senate continuing the discussion and coming to some resolution. I do not quite see how we can come to a resolution, but we ought to be able to come to a resolution and a high degree of agreement as to where our interests are.

Is it in the interest of this country to pursue the war indefinitely with the escalating cost of money and lives? Is it in the interest of this country to bring the war to a close by some kind of compromise?

I do not think that approach has been explored as it should be, certainly through the U.N.

I commend the Senator for at least bringing up the question for proper discussion.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, although it is so very war develops strong, spiritual, moral, and emotional, that very often impel many people to take a given
course of action. Even in the War Between the States it was so.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That was the trouble.

Mr. DIRKSEN. The party of Lincoln, who came to hold a convention, decided that there would be a rump convention and that they would not nominate the Commander in Chief.

The person who then corresponded to the Republican national chairman today sought Lincoln with every talent he had to get the soldiers back before the No.ember election and to get this thing over and to receive some negotiators from the South.

I think history will tell this out, that Lincoln met aboard ship two of them that he was brought through the lines.

Lincoln listened very carefully and then he took a piece of paper. At the top he wrote:

No. 1. The Union must be preserved.
No. 2. Slavery must be abolished.

He then said:

Gentlemen, you sit in the rest of it, the disposition of the horses, the military material, the feed stocks, all of that. You write that there is in, but just leave No. 1 and No. 2 at the top, and I will sign it.

You see, we are up against a decision of some kind, No. 1. Do we quit? Do we retreat? Do we go ahead to a victory and be made scapegoats? And if we do, I think that we throw away whatever leverage we have.

What is the answer? I am content to go along in the interest of our troops with that position that does not forfeit our leverage in the hope that there can be negotiation and put it on thicker and thicker if necessary. I learned long ago that it is the hit dog that yelps. They are being hit. They are being hurt, and they are beginning to yelp.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What does the Senator have in mind as the final outcome in this area? What does he want to achieve here? Does he want a colony?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I wonder what the Senator has in mind that we wish to have there in the foreseeable future.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Do we have any commitment under the Southeast Asian Treaty?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Not to do what we are doing.

Mr. DIRKSEN. No?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think so.

Mr. DIRKSEN. What are the commitments? It is aredoental area to cooperate with the other members of the Southeast Asian Treaty as to what course we should take. There was no guarantee that we were to come to their aid in South Vietnam.

Mr. DIRKSEN. No commitment as to self-determination?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I think you had better reexamine that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have reexamined it. That is the opinion of a number of experts who appeared before our com-
Mr. DIRKSEN. Oh, no.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have rarely got into wars deliberately. You blunder into these wars. And what we are doing in assuming the mantle of the British Empire, and in beginning to accumulate bases such as Vietnam, is to expose us to the same kind of troubles the British had, to a gradual erosion of our power and our influence. We have already, I think, lost the sympathy of Western Europe in this policy—not because they do not have great respect for this country as such, as a great country, but they question our judgment in pursuing this war, which they believe is undermining the strength of this country.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I cannot believe that people, if they will blunder into this sort of thing, We did not blunder into it in Hiroshima or Nagasaki. That was done after the most prayerful deliberation. And when it was done, they picked up the pieces, assessed the damage, saw how many people were killed, and how by nuclear weapons you can convert a 1,500-ton ship to a rolling stream. That is not lost on the leaders anywhere in the world, and I cannot imagine that they are going to blunder into that sort of thing.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, of course, I wish I had the same faith the Senator has, even though we continue the policy because it apparently inspires his allegiance to this policy in Southeast Asia, which is to fight off this Red menace, that he at the same time thinks they are going to be so reasonable that they will never engage in a nuclear war. I think you are trying to have it both ways. If they are as dangerous a menace as you would lead us to believe because of Vietnam, then, surely, we could have no assurance that they would not use nuclear weapons.

Mr. DIRKSEN. They know that nobody ever won an earthquake, and they are not going to blunder into this.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not see why the Senator thinks that they are behind Vietnam and that this is a step intended to attack us.

Mr. DIRKSEN. They are certainly behind North Vietnam. Have you any doubt about Soviet weapons over there?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Oh, no. But they are helping us along, in the same way we have helped them. That does not mean the Soviets are intending to use South Vietnam. We have North Vietnam as a stepping-stone to attack us.

Mr. DIRKSEN. We are not over there to conquer anybody.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Why not? You just said we are going to have a base there.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I did not say we are going to have a base there.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was trying to develop what the Senator did say.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Certainly did not. We are over there to help South Vietnam preserve their Republic, their freedom, their self-determination, and, over and above everything else, freedom from aggression.

Now, why is the Soviet Union helping North Vietnam? For freedom's reasons? No. To conquer South Vietnam. That is the difference. It is certainly a sharp difference in principle.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, of course, I need not tell you about this idea of aggression—the other side believes we are the aggressor. We have intervened in a civil war, a war between Vietnamese. The Senator does not deny that. These are all basically Vietnamese.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Basically, yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. And we do not live there as a foreign country, and we intend to.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What would have been the situation if the Chinese had sent a hundred thousand men over here during our Civil War?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I am glad I do not have to speculate on that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is a civil war; and the assumption that everybody believes that this is an outright aggression by one national state or another is open to question: is it not?

Mr. DIRKSEN. It seems to me that from the very days of Ngo Dinh Diem and I think we used meeting with them and going over there—they were just trying to set up a republic to suit themselves. They were content to leave their neighbors to the north alone. That did not satisfy Ho Chi Minh—not on your life. He was going to bring all of what was ancient Indochina into the fold, no matter what it cost. We may charge him with aggression.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. All we tried to do in the South, since the Senator referred to the Lincoln principle, was to set up our own government, if the North would leave us alone, but the North would not do that.

Mr. DIRKSEN. The North did not try to conquer the South. We had a Constitution.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But we did set up a Confederacy, yet the North insisted on conquering us anyhow.

Mr. DIRKSEN. No, we did not; we took exception to Calhoun's Doctrine of Nullification and said that the South just could not recognize them.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is what Ho Chi Minh said to Diem.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Ho Chi Minh had nothing to say.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. He thought he should have.

Mr. DIRKSEN. That is a different thing.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Just as Lincoln thought he should have.

Mr. DIRKSEN. No, Lincoln did not. Lincoln was guided by the Constitution that applied to the Senator's State as well as it applied to his own State. The South walked out on it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Before I sit down, I should say a brief clarification. I misunderstood the Senator to say that we needed a base; that we intended South Vietnam to be a permanent base for the United States.

Mr. DIRKSEN. If I said that, I would have opened up the whole subject of colonialism, which is as alien as anything I know of to our concept of government.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not want to prolong the discussion, but I should like to clarify the question. What does the Senator say is the objective of our war in Vietnam? What is it that we wish to achieve that is worthy of what we are doing?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I mentioned security. Obviously, it would take a long military lecture of global dimensions to persuade my friend from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; I mean what concrete effect would result in Vietnam?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Did I not recite the right? That it is up to people to decide their destiny for themselves, particularly their political destiny?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Are we going to leave Vietnam?

Mr. DIRKSEN. We undertook to fulfill a commitment under the SEATO Treaty, while we did not ask for much in Geneva in 1954, we think we came away from there somewhat with the idea that if they had to have help and asked for it, we would help. What happened?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Did not Diem ask us for help? We put him in office; he was "our boy."

Mr. DIRKSEN. We did not put him. Only the people of South Vietnam put him there. Diem went around the countryside, talking to South Vietnamese farmers, rice farmers, and everyone else. He was a very popular person. I listened to him when he was on the platform at the time. We did not put him in: he put himself in.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator mean to say that Diem was elected in a free election?

Mr. DIRKSEN. No; I mean that he undertook, by going around the country, to get the trust and confidence of the people there. Then, too, of course, there had to be a leader to take over sometime after the war, and a more natural leader than Ngo Dinh Diem? But we did not put him in.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The fact is that he created such a dictatorship that we had to come to his aid and support him all the time.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I am sorry to say that this has been badly exaggerated.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is a very grave difference of opinion as to the historical fact.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But it is clear that the Senator does not wish us to incorporate this as a colony or a military base. He said that, and he does not wish us to be there permanently.

Mr. DIRKSEN. How often must I say that we do not go in for colonization at all? As for setting up a base there, if I know the meaning of the word—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There are people who say we have set up bases there.

Mr. DIRKSEN. You say there are people who have not heard them.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has not heard them?

Mr. DIRKSEN. No, sir.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think it is very important to clarify what our purposes are in Vietnam. I would put it this way to see if it comes closer to the Senator's thought. The Senator says that we guarantee the right of self-determination, that they can decide, and that it was a good election. Why is that so if we do not leave or turn it over to them?
Mr. DIRKSEN. You have an enemy up there and you have to make sure—
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That means we stay.
Mr. DIRKSEN. What does the Senator want to do? You have not heard me quarreling with the President. You have done the same thing that I have, and you have been doing it for the last year about the conduct of the war.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.
Mr. DIRKSEN. What does the Senator want to do?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have said it.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Tell the Senate. Does the Senator want to quit now and pull out?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. What I would like to see happen—whether it will happen this month, I do not know. But it is a very important issue to the people of the Geneva conference, and our agreeing to abide by the result. We did not agree the last time at the last minute. We refused to agree.
Mr. DIRKSEN. We were not even a signatory.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Nobody was. There was agreement to it, and we refused to agree. We can neither claim rights nor claim other people's rights under it. The Senator is correct. We were not a signatory.
I would like to see a return to the principles of the Geneva conference. The President himself, at the time of his speech at Johns Hopkins, said that was his desire. The North Vietnamese have said that was a basic principle. I would like to see that, and a negotiation under the co-chairmanship of Great Britain and Russia; and that they come to an agreement as to a way to have elections, full and free elections, throughout South Vietnam to create their government; and we would come home.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Has the Senator heard Ho Chi Minh ask for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; but I have not heard us either. This is what I would like to see happen.
Mr. DIRKSEN. He is the guy taking the pasting. He is the guy being pushed around.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes; and so are we.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Why not ask, and see what the reaction is?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The reason is that he feels he has been unjustly attacked. I regret very much that he has not responded to these offers we have made. I think he is wrong for his benefit and for our benefit. Do not misunderstand me. What does Ho Chi Minh have at stake? A little God-forsaken country of 15 million or 16 million people.
We are threatening the security of the other countries in the world, on which other countries depend economically, politically, and morally. This is a great undertaking and a great risk.
The Senator's expression of a moment ago reassured me when he said he was not a Senator toessler good faith. He is a man of high faith.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Neither am I, but I think the course we are following will do it in the bitter end. We are exhausting this for what? Suppose we take all of Vietnam. Is it worth it? The price we are paying for that is all out of proportion to the price we can gain. We cannot do all of this. At least 15 or 30 million peo-
Mr. DIRKSEN. Would the Senator like to tell the rest of the story about the Consular Treaty?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was mentioning only that it was approved by the Senate. The press said—and I do not want to misquote without checking—that the Senator from Illinois did not positively oppose it. I think the Senator was right. Do not misunderstand me, I thought this was a sign of a degree of relaxation of the kind of fear and apprehension that afflicted us at the height of the Stalin era. I think we were quite justified in being apprehensive because Stalin was a very determined and resourceful man. But I think, since then, there has been a lessening of pressure, a relaxation of that conflict, that they are moving themselves internally more toward a different and more relaxed system.

Mr. DIRKSEN. All that has exactly nothing to do with it. I am sure that we can imagine the man who sat in my office—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. DIRKSEN. And brought us all that information which I could not even discuss.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator is quite correct. I did not mean to criticize him, I merely meant to say I thought this was a sign that he accepted a change or an evolution taking place in the Communist world. I think in the Kremlin and in Eastern Europe there are signs of it. China is in a class by itself.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It was not a sign at all.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It was not?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Just coming to grips with naked reality.